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"HUMANITY ON THE BALLOT": THE 
CITIZEN INTIATIVE AND OREGON'S WAR 
OVER GAY CML RIGHTS 
ELIZABETH A. ThDESCO* 
Abstract: The citizen initiative, a form of "direct democracy" by which 
citizens both draft and enact their own law, is often described by its 
supporters as the truest and most representative form of democratic 
government. As Constitutional framers recognized by the creation of 
the Guarantee Clause, however, the pure expression of the people's will 
must always be tempered by legislative compromise and judicial 
constraint. Unchecked, individual voters' fears and private biases come 
to be memorialized as state code and as constitutional amendments. In 
this Note, the author highlights the discriminatory nature of the citizen 
initiative process both generally, and as it targets gay men and lesbians 
in cities and states across America. Particular attention is paid to the 
situation of gay men and lesbians in Oregon, where a series of failed 
citizen initiatives has nonetheless succeeded in creating a climate of 
hostility and intolerance. The author urges the Supreme Court to 
accept jurisdiction in cases where citizen initiatives target minority 
rights, upholding a constitutional scheme that explicitly favors 
representative state government. 
In September of 1992, Lon Mabon, founder and chairman of the 
Oregon Citizen's Alliance (OCA) , walked among the aging trailers at 
his headquarters in an industrial park off of Oregon's Interstate 5.1 
"These are the first units of the cultural war meeting on a political 
battlefield," he portended.2 "It's about a lot of citizens concerned at 
the direction the culture's going. "3 
Since then, Mabon's battle has been all that he foretold, and it 
continues to rage today.4 The "war" is over the political and social 
* Senior Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL (2001-2002). 
1 John E. Yang, Lines Drawn in Oregon Gay Rights Battle; Votm to Decide if Constitution WiU 
Declare Homosexuality 'Abnorma~ Wrong, Unnatura~' WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1992, at A21. 
2 [d. 
S [d. 
4 See Bill Graves, Measure 9 Defeated; New Battle Expected, OREGONIAN, Nov. 9, 2000, at 
Cl. 
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status of lesbians and gay men5 in Oregon. The battlefield is made up 
of voting booths throughout the state, from urban Portland and 
Eugene to the rural farmland that surrounds the OCA headquarters 
in Brooks. In these booths, Oregon voters may curtail the civil rights 
of gay men and lesbians by amending their state laws and constitution 
through the use of citizen initiatives.6 
Mabon has proposed three such initiatives in eight years, each 
more moderately tailored to the aim of "countering the gay rights 
movement."7 In 1992, his proposed constitutional amendment 
branded homosexuality "unnatural, perverse," and akin to pedophilia 
and sadism.s The measure, which required a majority of votes to pass, 
failed by fourteen percent.9 In 1994, the OCA sponsored another 
constitutional amendment to forbid government "approval" of homo-
sexuality as a protected class under the Oregon Constitution's equal 
protection clause.10 This measure failed by the much slimmer margin 
of six percent.ll In November of 2000, Oregonians decided whether 
to approve a statutory amendment that would ban public school in-
struction that "promotes" homosexuality.12 On election night, the 
race was called a "cliffhanger," but eventually urban vote tallies re-
vealed that Measure 9 was again defeated by six percent.13 The meas-
5 The characterization "lesbians and gay men" is commonly used in academic litera-
ture regarding gay and lesbian issues. See William E. Adams, Is it Animus or a Difference of 
opinion? The Problems Caused iJy Invidious Intent of A nti-Gay Ballot Measures, 34 WILLAMETTE 
L. REv. 449, 450 (1998). These measures also pose threats to bisexual persons, but the 
measures themselves speak only of lesbians and gay men or "homosexuals." Id. For this 
reason, references to gay men and lesbians in this Note also include bisexual persons, at 
least to the extent that their same-sex sexual behavior and affectional preferences are af-
fected.Id. 
6 Article N, Section 1 of the Oregon Constitution enables registered voters to place 
proposed constitutional amendments or statutes on the ballot after submitting a signed 
petition, obtaining a ballot title, and securing valid signatures of registered voters equal to 
a specified percent of the votes cast for governor at the preceding general election. OR. 
CONST. art. N, § I. 
7 See Graves, supra note 4. 
8 See ANTI-GAY RIGHTS: ASSESSING VOTER INITIATIVES 165 (Stephanie L. Witt & 
Suzanne McCorkle eds., 1997) [hereinafter ANTI-GAY RIGHTS]. 
9 See Brian T. Meehan, Measure 9 Reveals Deep Splits Among Voters, OREGONIAN, Nov. 5, 
1992, at AI. Even though the measure failed, it still received over 560,000 "yes" votes. See 
Hospitality, Not Hostility, OREGONIAN, Nov. 5, 1992, at C12. 
10 See ANTI-GAY RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 165-66. 
11 See By the Numbers, OREGONIAN, Nov. 11, 1994, at CI. Measure 13 received 457,822 
"yes" votes and 515,660 "no" votes. Id. 
12 See Oregon Voter's Pamphlet (on file with author). 
U See Measure 9 Losing in Election Cliffhanger; OREGONIAN, Nov. 8, 2000, at Cl; Meehan, 
supra note 9; CNN.com, Voter Results in Oregon, at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/ 
2000/results/OR/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2001) [hereinafter Voter Results in Oregon]. 
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ure received almost 700,000 votes, however, the most of any OCA ini-
tiative.14 The day after the election, Mabon reported, "I'm actually 
sitting here rewriting the measure .... It just comes down to a little 
bit more money and I think we would've won."15 
The citizen initiative, a form of "direct democracy," is a process 
by which citizens can draft a law or constitutional amendment and 
then collect a requisite number of signatures to add the measure to 
the ballot.I6 To some, the process represents democratic government 
in its "purest and highest form. "17 These proponents of the citizen 
initiative see it as an opportunity to bypass legislative corruption and 
inefficiency. IS In the storied tradition of New England town meetings, 
voters are able to debate and decide the matters of greatest impor-
tance to them. I9 Mabon appears to invoke this sentiment, in noting 
that, "a lot of citizens" stand behind OCA initiatives, and are "con-
cerned at the direction the culture's going."20 
Critics of the initiative system, however, point to many of its prac-
tical flaws and are skeptical as to whether citizen-sponsored ballot 
measures truly represent issues of real concern to voters.21 Instead, 
some argue, many of the issues simply reflect the concerns of ideo-
logical or reform groups who have been unsuccessful in lobbying the 
legislature.22 These groups, critics claim, are able to play on voters' 
fears and prejudices to target certain minority groups whose social 
status is otherwise unproblematic for the majority of citizens.23 
In a strictly representative mode of government, critics argue, 
legislators' tendencies toward prejudice are chastened by legislative 
14 See Voter Results in Oregon, supra note 13. The second Measure 9 received 688,572 
"yes" votes and 771,205 "no" votes. Id. 
15 See Graves, supra note 4. 
16 See David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum 
Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 13, 13 (1995); CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, THE INITIATIVE AND 
REFERENDUM IN OREGON 4 (1996) (on file with author). 
17 See CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, supra note 16, at 11. 
18 See Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Structuring the BaUot Initiative: Procedures That 
Do andDon't Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 47, 56 (1995). 
19 See id. at 53; Magleby, supra note 16, at 19; David Schuman, The Origin of State Consti-
tutional Direct Democracy: William Simon U'Ren and "The Oregon System, " 67 ThMPLE L. REv. 
947,947 (1994). 
20 See Yang, supra note 1. 
21 See Derrick A. Bell,Jr., The Referendum: Democracy ~ Bamer to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. 
L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1978-1979); Magleby, supra note 16, at 35-36. For practical flaws, see 
infra notes 204-255 and accompanying text. 
22 See Magleby, supra note 16, at 35-36. 
2~ See id. at 41; Adams, supra note 5, at 458-59; Bell, supra note 21, at 14. 
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debate, public scrutiny and political compromise.24 But when the leg-
islative process is turned back to the citizenry, few of these factors that 
counsel moderation for public officials are likely to affect individual 
voters' private biases.25 Initiatives designed to curtail fair housing, gay 
civil rights, or to promote so-called "English-only" education are 
among the categories of ballot measures that are seen to exploit voter 
"passions" for the sake of discrimination. 26 
The initiative's propensity for stirring discriminatory sentiment is 
of particular danger to minority interests in states such as Oregon, 
California and Colorado, where state code and constitutions are 
amended relatively easily, and often.27 By 1992-the year of the first 
OCA-sponsored initiative-274 citizen initiatives had been submitted 
to Oregon voters, more than in any other state.28 And the trend to-
ward citizen-sponsored initiatives is growing: Oregon's voter's pam-
phlet for the 2000 general election was "the size of a telephone book" 
with twenty-six different ballot initiatives, including the OCA's latest 
near-miss amendment to curtail gay civil rights. 29 
As many critics have noted, the sense that pure democratic voting 
leads to excesses of majority "passion" is not a recent phenomenon.3o 
As articulated in The Federalist Papers, James Madison presaged that in 
systems of direct democracy, minority interests would tend to be op-
pressed by tyrannical majority factions. 31 His concerns led to the 
adoption of Article IV, Section 4 of the United States Constitution 
which assures that "[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State 
in this Union a Republican Form of Government."32 Known as the 
Guarantee Clause, it represents the framers' intention that the gov-
24 Bell, supra note 21, at 29. 
25Id. at 14. 
26 See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Judicial Review of Initiatives and Referendums in Which Majari-
ties Vote on Minarities' Democratic CitizenshiP, 60 OHIO ST. LJ. 399, 426, 428, 433 (1999). 
27 See Michael Gillette, The Legislative Function: Initiative and Referendum, 67 OR. L. REv. 
55,59 (1988). In Oregon, "[iJffifty percent of the people vote in an election but only forty 
percent of those people vote on the constitutional amendment in question, and a bare 
majority of that forty percent votes in favor of the constitutional amendment, less than a 
majority of people eligible to vote in this state will have changed the law for everybody." Id. 
at 61. 
28 See Magleby, supra note 16, at 26. 
29 All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast, Nov. 6, 2000). 
30 See Bell, supra note 21, at 14-15; Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking is Not "Re-
publican Government": The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REv. 19, 32-33 (1993); 
Magleby, supra note 16, at 41. 
31 SeeTHE FEDERALIST, No. 10, at 54-55, No. 49, at 323, No. 51, at 333-34, No. 63, at 
403-04 (James Madison) (Modern Library ed., 2000); Linde, supra note 30, at 32-33. 
32 U.S. CONST. art. lV, § 4; see Linde, supra note 30, at 22-24. 
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ernment's power must be "derived from" the people, but not exer-
cised by the people en masse.33 
This explicit constitutional provision, however, has been ren-
dered ineffective by the Supreme Court's reluctance to decide on the 
politically risky subject of a state's governmental structure.54 This reti-
cence, combined with the Court's limited Fourteenth Amendment 
protection of gay civil rights, has left lesbian and gay Americans with 
very little constitutional recourse against majority attack in the form 
of citizen initiatives.35 
Part I of this Note highlights the OCA's damaging and divisive 
efforts to amend Oregon's laws and constitution and describes the 
national history of anti-gay civil rights initiatives. Part II provides an 
overview of the initiative process, including its history and prolifera-
tion throughout the western United States. Also, it provides a detailed 
evaluation of the citizen initiative, demonstrating how OCA-
sponsored measures exemplify some of the larger practical problems 
with direct democracy. Part III describes the ideological concerns 
about direct democracy that were shared by the framers of the Consti-
tution and that led to the inclusion of the Guarantee Clause. Also, it 
addresses how the Supreme Court's refusal to adjudicate Guarantee 
Clause claims, and its reluctance to extend Fourteenth Amendment 
protections, has rendered gay men and lesbians highly vulnerable in 
the face of discriminatory citizen initiatives. This Note concludes by 
urging the Supreme Court to accept jurisdiction in cases where citi-
zen-initiated measures have targeted minority rights, and to uphold 
the constitutional scheme that explicitly favors representative state 
government. 
33 Linde, supra note 30, at 27; see THE FEDERALIST, supra note 31, No. 10, at 54-55, No. 
49, at 323, No. 51, at 333-34, No. 63, at 403-04 (James Madison). 
34 See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Pac. States Tele. & Tele. Co. v. Ore-
gon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Lutherv. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849). 
35 See generally Romerv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Bakerv. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); 
Pac. States Tele. & Tele. Co., 223 U.S. 118; Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849); Equal. 
Found. of Greater Cincinnati Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997); Bailey 
v. City of Austin, 972 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. App. 1998). 
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I. OREGON AND THE BATTLE AGAINST GAY CIVIL RIGHTS 
A. The Trumpet is Sounded: Measure 9 and the 1992 Election 
MEASURE 9 
Amends Oregon Constitution. All governments in Oregon 
may not use their monies or properties to promote, encour-
age, or facilitate homosexuality, pedophilia, sadism or maso-
chism. All levels of government, including public educa-
tional systems, must assist in setting a standard for Oregon's 
youth which recognizes that these "behaviors" are "abnor-
mal, wrong, unnatural, and perverse," and that they are to 
be discouraged and avoided .... 36 
Ballot Measure 9 was first introduced in 1991.37 With its highly 
inflammatory language, this measure was the first and most extreme 
of the three proposed initiatives. It grouped homosexuality together 
with pedophilia, sadism, and masochism, and it provided specific pe-
jorative language with which to brand gay and lesbian Oregonians. 38 
Despite the eventual defeat of the OCA at this phase of the battle, 
Measure 9's divisive language set the stage for a cultural war that is far 
from over. 39 
By its terms, Measure 9 proposed to amend the Oregon Constitu-
tion in order to prohibit the state from establishing protections based 
on sexual orientation.40 It would ban the state from "encouraging 
homosexuality" and would require agencies and schools to set a stan-
dard that homosexuality was "abnormal and pelVerse. "41 
Beyond these explicit forms of discrimination and intolerance, 
however, opponents feared that the measure would have far-reaching 
consequences for education and employment.42 Many openly gay pub-
lic employees worried that their jobs would be threatened by the 
36 See ANTI-GAY RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 165. The measure continues, "State may not 
recognize this conduct under sexual orientation or sexual preference levels, or through 
quotas, minority status, affirmative action, or similar concepts." See id. 
37 See id. at 18. 
38 See id. at 165. 
39 See Brian T. Meehan, Ballot Measure 9 Creates Climate of Fear, OREGONIAN, Oct. 17, 
1992, at AI. 
40 See ANTI-GAY RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 165. 
41 See Alliance that Battled Measure 9 Looks to the Future, OREGONIAN, Nov. 22, 1992, at Cl. 
42 See id.; Bill Graves, Schools in the Balance, OREGONIAN, Oct. 25, 1992, at Dl. 
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amendment's broad mandate that state agencies "discourage" homo-
sexuality.43 Educators predicted that the measure would also threaten 
the jobs of lesbian and gay teachers, ban hundreds of books relating 
to homosexuality, and censor teacher's interpretations of literature.44 
Mabon countered these concerns by noting that gay and lesbian 
teachers would not lose their jobs, as long as they remained in the 
closet.45 He also argued that teachers could still talk about gay and 
lesbian artists and their works, provided that they reminded students 
homosexuality is wrong.46 
On an ideological level, Measure 9 was highly divisive.47 Charac-
terized as a "bitter struggle," lines were drawn through almost every 
imaginable demographic classification of Oregonians.48 Exit polls re-
vealed a deep divide between Oregonians with varying levels of in-
come and education, and through gender lines.49 In rural areas, 
Measure 9 was a war against the imposition of "urban values. "50 To 
born-again Christians and the majority of regular church-goers, it was 
a war over fundamental notions of right and wrong.51 To some lesbian 
and gay Oregonians, however, it was also a threat to their very lives. 52 
True to the nature of any "war," physical violence was also a com-
ponent of the first battle over gay rights in Oregon.53 During 1992, 
"bias" crimes in Oregon increased sharply from the prior year, with 
eighty-seven reported crimes against gay men and lesbians within two 
months before the election.54 For example, in September, a black les-
bian and a gay man in Salem, Oregon were killed when their home 
43 See Graves, supra note 42. 
44 See ill. 
43 See id. 
46 See ill. 
47 See Meehan, supra note 39; Meehan, supra note 9. 
48 See Meehan, supra note 9. 
49 See ill. As income and education rose, support for Measure 9 waned. Id. About 55% 
of high school graduates supported it, compared with 35% of college graduates and 22% 
of people with postgraduate degrees. Id. The initiative produced a gender gap of about ten 
percentage points. Id. 55% of "yes" voters were men; 45% were women. Id .. 
50 See AU Things Considered, supra note 29. Of Oregon's thirty-six counties, nine urban 
counties surrounding Portland and Eugene rejected the measure, and twenty-seven of 
Oregon's smaller rural counties approved it. See Meehan, supra note 9. 
51 See Meehan, supra note 9. Voters who described themselves as born-again fundamen-
talists or regular church-goers were the most loyal supporters of the measure. Id. More 
than seven of ten fundamentalists and six of ten regular church-goers voted for the meas-
ure. Id. 
52 See Meehan, supra note 39. 
5~ See id. 
54 See id. 
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was firebombed by suspected white supremacists. 55 Calls to a hot line 
run by the Lesbian Community Project also increased dramatically, 
reporting as many as ninety-one incidents of intimidation or violence 
in one month.56 
In October, vandals spray-painted anti-gay and pro-Measure 9 
graffitti on the exterior of a church whose leaders had spoken in op-
position to Measure 9.57 Five nights later, the vandals returned, scrawl-
ing epithets aimed at gays and lesbians, minorities, Jews and Catholics 
in red paint all around the inside of the church.58 Thus, a month be-
fore the state-wide election, the OCA had already succeeded in chang-
ing the cultural climate as acts of intolerance flared up around the 
state.59 
The "No on 9" campaign attempted to capitalize on the lack of 
outspoken support for the measure by publicizing the opposition of 
influential public figures in Oregon life.60 According to Oregon's 
largest newspaper, The Oregonian, "every major civic and political 
figure in Oregon," as well as "an array of business, religious, labor and 
cultural groups" stood publicly against the measure.61 These included 
the current governor and four past governors, the Republican and 
Democratic party leaders, the attorney general, senators, congress-
men, and associations of Catholic, Jewish, Lutheran, and Presbyterian 
clergy.62 National figures such as Jesse Jackson, David Dinkins, and 
even William F. Buckley publicly denounced the initiative.63 "No on 9" 
raised over $2 million dollars for the purpose of amplifying these 
voices of dissent.64 
In contrast, few public figures outside the OCA and Christian 
fundamentalist groups came forward to support Measure 9.65 Instead, 
the ''Yes on 9" campaign avoided traditional media in favor of a grass-
55 Blaze Damages Salem House Where 2 Died in Firebombing, OREGONIAN, Nov. 29, 1992, at 
D3. 
56 Meehan, supra note 39. During 1991, 483 incidents of intimidation or violence 
against gays and lesbians were reported for the entire year. Id. 
57Id. 
58 Id. 
59 See id. 
60 See Sura Rubenstein, OCA Head Pledges Stripped-Down Version of Measure 9 for 1994, 
OREGONIAN, Nov. 8,1992, at AI. 
61Id. 
62 ANTI-GAY RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 19. 
63Id. 
64 See id. 
65 See id. 
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roots "No Special Rights" campaign.66 Utilizing fliers, speeches, video-
taped presentations, and mass mailings, the OCA used emotional ap-
peals and often misrepresentation to gain support where mere am-
bivalence had stood.67 
One cable television advertisement featured a black American 
woman who "believe[s] in right and wrong.''68 She said: 
As a mother, I would never allow the public schools to teach 
my children that racism or drug abuse is good and normal. I 
do not want them to teach my children that homosexual be-
havior is good and normal either .... Please--Iet's protect 
our children from what's wrong. It's not discrimination, it's 
just common sense.69 
This advertisement seemed to invoke a paranoid sense of parental 
obligation, providing the indignation that voting parents lacked from 
any personal experience with the "homosexual agenda. "70 Particularly 
in conservative rural areas, classes were most often led by similarly 
conservative teachers who had no intention of promoting homosexu-
ality.71 But even in urban areas where schools were more likely to 
demonstrate acceptance of homosexuality, parents seem to have ex-
pressed very few concerns of this nature.72 One active parent, who led 
a movement to improve school funding and dealt with "hundreds of 
parents" over five years reported, "I have never heard a parent share 
with me concerns about the presentation of homosexuality in public 
schools. "73 A ten-year PTA member in Oregon's urban Clackamas 
County said, "I don't remember it coming up once. "74 
66 Id. As one commentator noted, the coded rhetoric of "special rights" enables oppo-
nents of gay rights to tap into deep and powerful reservoirs of social anxiety and anger 
about other anti-discrimination laws based on race, gender, and disability-particularly 
affirmative action measure~en as these opponents claim to champion existing civil 
rights protections. Adams, supra note 5, at 459. 
67 See ANTI-GAY RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 19; Analyzing the Ads, OREGONIAN, Oct. 20, 
1992, atB4. 
68 Analyzing the Ads, supra note 67, at B4. 
69 [d. 
70 See Rubenstein, supra note 60; David Sarasohn, Lon Mabon Discovers the Schools, ORE-
GONIAN, Nov. 3, 2000, at B9 [hereinafter Sarasohn, Lon Mabon Discovers]; David Sarasohn, 
Rural Oregrm Ponders the Real Threat, OREGONIAN, Nov. 4, 1994, at CIO [hereinafter Sara-
sohn, Rural Oregon Ponders] . 
71 See Graves, supra note 42; Sarasohn, Lon Mabon Discovers, supra note 70; Sarasohn, 
Rural Oregrm Ponders, supra note 70. 
72 See Sarasohn, Lon Mabon Discovers, supra note 70. 
73Id. 
74Id. 
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OCA's television advertisements featuring minority speakers also 
sought to portray the rejection of homosexuality as reasonable and 
socially moderate.75 They urged Oregon's socially conservative voters 
that one could reject homosexuality without being racist or bigoted. 76 
Incidentally, the truth was that most black Oregonians opposed the 
measure, along with virtually all of the major political and social or-
ganizations in Oregon-including the NAACP and the Urban 
League.77 In this way, the OCA attempted to gain wider support by 
using less representative spokespeople to speak in favor its cause. 78 
Another example of misleading campaigning is provided by an 
OCA radio advertisement.79 Taking a more extreme tactic, the adver-
tisement proclaimed that the "gay rights agenda" in Oregon was in-
clusive of an organization called the North American Man/Boy Love 
Association: "In a desire to legalize sex with children, NAMBlA has 
proposed first lowering the age of consent to 13, then eliminating the 
age of consent altogether. The gay rights agenda in Oregon does in-
clude pedophilia .... "80 Aside from the absurdity of promoting its 
cause in this fashion, the advertisement was premised on an utterly 
false assertion: there is no NAMBlA chapter in Oregon, and all main-
stream gay and lesbian groups, both locally and nationally, have con-
tinued to condemn both NAMBlA and pedophilia.81 As a result of 
such inflammatory advertising, the OCA exploited voters' prejudices 
and their geographic isolation from gay and lesbian Oregonians, 
thereby creating an atmosphere of hostility and gross misunderstand-
ing throughout the state. 
Despite the overwhelming and outspoken opposition to Measure 
9, over 500,000 Oregonians-and forty-five percent of those at the 
polls-voted in favor of it.82 One OCA ally, who appeared on "The 
Phil Donahue Show" in support of Measure 9, claimed that, "[t]his 
battle was created by militant homosexuals and sympathizers who 
want to give civil rights protections to a group based on private behav-
75 See Analyzing the Ads, supra note 67. 
76 See id. 
77 See id; ANTI-GAY RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 19. 
78 See Analyzing the Ads, supra note 67. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. 
8l [d. Spokespeople for the Lavender Network newspaper, which ran a NAMBLA ad-
vertisement in only two editions, said that the advertisment was mistakenly accepted by a 
volunteer staff member. [d. The newspaper's advertising guidelines prohibit accepting 
advertisements from NAMBLA. [d. 
82 See Meehan, supra note 9. 
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ior in the bedroom. "83 But the actual experiences of Oregonians wit-
ness the fact that prior to 1991, bedroom "behaviors" were actually pri-
vate and were no cause for battle at all. 84 
B. The Battle Rages on: Measure 13 and the Next Measure 9 
1. Measure 13 and the Election of 1994 
Measure 13 was the next state-wide initiative in opposition to the 
"homosexual agenda." Proposed in 1994, it was entitled the "Minority 
Status and Child Protection Act" and represented a scaled-down ver-
sion of the 1992 election's Measure 9, but its legal effects were the 
same in many significant waYS.85 Like Measure 9, Measure 13 would 
have banned state and local governments from protecting lesbians 
and gay men from discrimination based on sexual orientation.86 This 
constitutional amendment would have overturned anti-discrimination 
laws in four Oregon cities, including Portland.87 Moreover, the meas-
ure threatened "personnel action" against public employees whose 
sexual behaviors "disrupt the workplace. "88 
Measure 13 differed from its predecessor in that it did not seek 
explicit moral denouncement of homosexuality in the state constitu-
tion.89 Rather than requiring state and local governments to actively 
"discourage" homosexuality, the measure provided that public money 
could not be used in a manner that would approve it.9o Also, the OCA 
attempted to diffuse the book-banning issue of the previous campaign 
by specifically allowing for adult-only library books addressing homo-
sexuality.91 
Aside from these few changes, the OCA campaign strategy was 
largely unaltered, and the group continued to disseminate many of 
the same advertisements and videos.92 The campaign's focus on "child 
protection" provoked a strong response from some child advocates 
83 See Meehan, supra note 39. 
84 See ANTI-GAY RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 17; Rubenstein, supra note 60; Sarasohn, Lon 
Mabon Discovers, supra note 70; Sarasohn, Rural Oregon Ponders, supra note 70. 
85 See ANTI-GAY RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 20, 165. 
86 See id. at 17; Sura Rubenstein, What is Measure 13?, OREGONIAN, Oct. 30, 1994, at 
A22. 
87 Rubenstein, supra note 86. 
88 Id. 
89 ANTI-GAY RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 20. 
90 [d. at 165-66; Rubenstein, supra note 86. 
91 See ANTI-GAY RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 20. 
92 See id. 
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and counselors who worried that the introduction of Measure 13 had 
heightened the sense of fear and alienation faced by gay and lesbian 
teenagers.93 One counselor reported that the pressure from the 
Measure 9 debate had already added to the school dropout and sui-
cide rate of gay youth in Oregon.94 She urged that the social rejection 
embodied by the subsequent Measure 13 could be terrifying and even 
tragic for some of the children who were actually in need of "pro tec-
tion.''95 
As before, many parents and community members also recog-
nized that there had never been a need to protect their children from 
the homosexual agenda.96 In the rural community of Molalla, one 
voter articulated the unnecessary and wantonly divisive character of 
the OCA initiative.97 "The OCA came in, for its own ends, capitalizing 
on homophobia," he said. "We didn't have anybody going to Molalla 
City Council, asking it to legalize single-sex marriages."98 Despite this 
lack of pre-existing concern over homosexual activism, however, the 
OCA was prevailing upon formerly disinterested Oregon voters with 
increasing success: Measure 13 was defeated by the much smaller 
margin of fifty-three to forty-seven percent.99 
2. Measure 9 and the Election of 2000 
In November 2000, the OCA launched its most recent and most 
moderate attack in the battle against gay rights. This initiative, again 
called Measure 9, or the "Student Protection Act," took the form of a 
statutory amendment.100 The measure was narrowly tailored to public 
school instruction only, prohibiting schools from instructing students 
about homosexuality in a manner that "encourages, promotes or 
sanctions such behaviors. "101 It provided sanctions for any public ele-
93 See Osker Spicer, Journey Often Tough for Black Homosexuals, OREGONIAN, Nov. 10, 
1994, (Portland Zoner Magazine), at 1. 
94 See id. 
95 See id. 
96 See Sarasohn, Lon Mabon Discovers, supra note 70; Sarasohn, Rural Oregon Ponders, su-
pranote 70. 
97 See Sarasohn, Rural Oregon Ponders, supra note 70. 
98Id. 
99 See By the Numbers, supra note 11. 
100 Oregon Voter's Pamphlet, supra note 12. Interestingly, it appears that the OCA had 
borrowed some of the language used by its opposition in drafting the new measure. For 
example, one section of the measure provides that sexual orientation is a "divisive subject 
matter not necessary" to the instruction of students in public schools. Id. 
101Id. 
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mentary school, secondary school, or college should it fail to comply, 
threatening the loss of state funding. 102 
While this more moderate-seeming measure would be less politi-
cally entrenched than a constitutional amendment, Measure 9 was 
perhaps more dangerous to lesbian and gay Oregonians due to its in-
creased likelihood of success.103 The measure's form, language, and 
history made it appear more moderate, and some feared that voters 
with less extreme prejudices, who had rejected the previous acrimo-
nious and more fervent campaigns, might take this opportunity to 
vote against gay civil rights.104 This time, the "No on 9" rallies were 
smaller and the campaign funds fewer, but the threats of social aliena-
tion and censorship remained equally as real as in previous elec-
tions.105 
As with the OCA's previous measures, many of the same objec-
tions were raised against this Measure 9.106 An organizer of a rural 
Oregon "No on 9" campaign said, "the OCA did a great job of writing 
a ballot measure that deceived folks into believing that there was a 
problem when there wasn't."107 Echoing opponents of the previously 
defended Measure 13, she continued, "If this measure passes, our 
school will no longer be safe for all students. "108 A further argument 
against Measure 9 in the Oregon Voter's Pamphlet stated, "As parents, 
we know there is no curriculum in Oregon's public schools that 'en-
courages or promotes' homosexuality or bisexuality."l09 Rather, "[t]he 
real problems our schools face are a lack of funding and class sizes 
that are too large. "110 
102Id. 
103 As will be discussed in the next part of this note, statutory initiatives can be subject 
to legislative amendment and judicial review, whereas constitutional amendments negate 
any inconsistent portions of the Oregon constitution and can only be overturned by later 
amendments or by federal judicial review. Gillette, supra note 27, at 59. 
104 See Alice Tallmadge, Living in the Shadow of the OCA, Lessons from a Bitter Battle: Lane 
County Residents Disagree on the Long-Term Effects of Past Anti-Gay Rights Campaigns, OREGO-
NIAN, Oct. 22, 2000, at A2I. 
105 Bill Graves, Prayer Vigil Takes Aim at Measure 9, OREGONIAN, Nov. 2, 2000, at D18; 
Tallmadge, supra note 104. One vigil in a downtown Portland park reported only three 
dozen people in attendance. Graves, supra. Also, whereas "No on 9" campaign funds sur-
passed $2 million in 1992, tlIe campaign raised only $648,000 in 2000. Bill Graves & To-
moko Hosaka, Measure 9 Rips open Cultural Division, OREGONIAN, Oct. 22, 2000, at AI. 
106 See Measure 9 Losing in Cliffhanger Election, supra note 13; Tallmadge, supra note 104. 
107 See Measure 9 Losing in Cliffhanger Election, supra note 13. 
108Id. 
109 Oregon Voters Pamphlet, supra note 12. 
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While the tenor of the debate was generally more temperate, op-
ponents continued to fear that Measure 9's passage would add to the 
atmosphere of hostility for lesbian and gay Oregonians and stigmatize 
Oregon as an intolerant state.lll In the days prior to the election, local 
and national media reported that voters were evenly split on the is-
sue.1I2 
Due perhaps in part to a close presidential race and higher voter 
turnout around the state, Measure 9 eventually failed by a margin of 
six percent.l13 It received more ''yes'' votes than any other OCA initia-
tive, however, garnering just under 700,000 votes in twenty-seven 
counties around the state.1I4 Mabon was disappointed with what he 
anticipated would be a "fifty percent plus one" victory, but announced 
that he was presently drafting a similar measure for 2002.115 Using 
"language that [the voters] simply cannot misinterpret," he planned 
to dispel some voters' misconceptions that the measure would have 
"stopped" AIDS education and sex education, or would have 
"got[ten] open homosexuals fired."1I6 
Mabon declared that the battle against the homosexual agenda 
rests in the hands of the OCA.ll7 Deploring the Republicans in the 
Oregon legislature for not having the "courage of their convictions 
[to] take this on themselves," he willfully overlooks the fact that the 
party's leaders are publicly opposed to his brand of reform. lIS Calling 
the civil status of lesbian and gay Oregonians the "last great battle," 
Mabon vows that the cause is "too important" to let go, leaving many 
Oregonians to wonder, "important to whom?"1I9 
C. Mabon's War in Context 
A discussion of the history of anti-gay rights initiatives demon-
strates that the OCA's efforts are neither innovative nor isolated.l2o In 
III See Measure 9 Losing in Election Cliffhanger, supra note 13; Tallmadge, supra note 104. 
112 All Things Considered, supra note 29. 
113 See Voter &sults in Oregon, supm note 13. 
114 See id. 
115 See Measure 9 Losing in Election Cliffhanger, supra note 13. 
116 See Tomoko Hosaka, Mabon &adies Next Round in 'Last Great Battle, ' OREGONIAN, 
Nov. 12,2000, at C5. 
117 See id. 
118 See id. 
119 See id.; ANTI-GAY RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 17; Rubenstein, supra note 60; Sarasohn, 
Lon Mabon Discovers, supra note 70; Sarasohn, Rural Oregon Ponders, supra note 70; Tall-
madge, supra note 104. 
120 See Adams, supra note 5, at 458-67; Lazos Vargas, supra note 26, at 428-32. 
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fact, the first such initiative was successful under the slogan "Save Our 
Children" in Dade County, Florida in 1977, and utilized prejudice and 
religious rhetoric to repeal an ordinance that forbade discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation.12l Over the past twenty years, initia-
tives curtailing the civil rights of lesbians and gay men have prolifer-
ated and have become increasingly successfu1.122 
In the year following the victory over gay rights in Dade County, 
similar measures were used to repeal non-discrimination ordinances 
in a number of other cities throughout the country, including 
Eugene, Oregon.123 These efforts gained momentum in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s.124 Oregon led the way in 1988, when an OCA ballot 
measure repealed a gubernatorial executive order that banned dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation.125 The Oregon Court of Ap-
peals overturned the repeal as unconstitutional, but it set the stage for 
the OCA's first Measure 9 and a similar measure in Colorado.126 
While the extreme language of the 1992 Measure 9 failed, the 
Colorado measure, which more closely resembled Oregon's 1994 
Measure 13, was approved fifty-four to forty-six percent by its citi-
zens.127 As this measure was challenged in the state court, working its 
way ultimately to the Supreme Court, Florida and Maine passed state-
wide initiatives to freeze existing categories of protected classes, 
thereby excluding lesbians and gay men.128 Additionally, in 1992 and 
1993, anti-discrimination laws were repealed by cities in five states 
through the initiative process.129 Even San Francisco, thought to be 
one of the most accepting cities for gay men and lesbians, repealed a 
domestic partnership law in 1989.130 
Aside from Measure 9's loss in Oregon, and two failed measures 
in St. Paul, Minnesota and Portland, Maine that would have repealed 
local anti-discrimination laws, these anti-gay rights initiatives met pri-
marily with approvaI.131 The victories subsequently emboldened "citi-
121 See Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 
258 (1997). 
122 See Adams, supra note 5, at 458; Lazos Vargas, supra note 26, at 428-29. 
123 See Adams, supra note 5, at 458. 
124Id. 
125 See Tomoko Hosaka, The OCA's Initiatives, OREGONIAN, Sept. 10,2000, at A17. 
126 See Merrick v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 841 P.2d 646, 651 (Or. Ct. App. 1992). 
127 See Adams, supra note 5, at 459 n.56. 
128 See id. at 460. 
129 See Gamble, supra note 121, at 259. 
130 See id. 
13l See id.; Adams, supra note 5, at 460. 
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zens alliances" around the country, who attempted to place such ini-
tiatives on ballots in ten states in 1994.132 However, petitioners failed 
to collect sufficient signatures to place the measures on the ballots in 
seven of these states.133 Moreover, one measure was invalidated by the 
Florida Supreme Court for violating the state's single subject re-
quirement.l34 The remaining measures, in Oregon and Idaho, were 
rejected by voters.135 
Additionally, with Romer v. Evans in 1996, the United States Su-
preme Court invalidated Colorado's popularly elected "Amendment 
2" that created a constitutional amendment to prohibit legislative, 
executive, or judicial actions designed to protect gay men and lesbians 
from discrimination.136 The Court held that the amendment had a 
"peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability 
on a single named group," and that the amendment lacked "a rational 
relationship to legitimate state interests."137 The Court noted that, "if 
constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means any-
thing, it must at the very least mean that a bare desire to harm a po-
litically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental 
interest. "138 
132 See Adams, supra note 5, at 460-61. 
133 See id. at 461. 
134 See In re Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen.: Restricts Laws Related to Discrimi-
nation, 632 So.2d 1018, 1021 (Fla. 1994). State constitutions that include citizen initiative 
processes often also include a "single subject requirement." See id.; CITY CLUB OF PORT-
LAND, supra note 16, at 15, 17. This provision requires that the initiative "shall embrace 
one subject only" in order to simplifY the voter's choice. See In re Advisory opinion, 632 
So.2d at 1019; CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, supra note 16, at 15, 17. 
135 See Gamble, supra note 121, at 262; By the Numbers, supra note 11. 
136 See generally 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
137 See id. at 632. Under the Fourteenth Amendment law of substantive due process, 
when courts are confronted with an enactment that targets a "suspect class," they employ 
"strict scrutiny" to ensure that the enactment is tied to some legitimate governmental in-
terest. See id. at 629-30. For all other laws, courts must merely find a "rational relationship" 
between the enactment and a legitimate governmental interest. See id. at 632. In Romer, the 
Court avoided the issue of whether "homosexual persons" constituted a "suspect class" by 
stating that Amendment 2 failed the lower standard of finding a rational relationship be-
tween the amendment and a legitimate governmental interest. See id. at 631-32. The Court 
held that the "sheer breadth" of the prohibition in Amendment 2 was "so discontinuous 
with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but 
animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state inter-
ests." Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
138 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-35 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that, "[aJ law 
declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all 
others to SC"ek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in 
the most literal sense." See id. at 633. 
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This particularly encouraging year for gay rights advocates was an 
exception to the overall pattern of approval for anti-gay rights initia-
tives.139 Including 1997 and 1998 initiatives in Washington and Ha-
waii, and many successful initiatives at the local level, thirty-four of 
forty-three (seventy-nine percent) ballot measures involving sexual 
orientation have resulted in the limitation of gay rights. l4O 
On a practical level, these anti-gay rights measures have the effect 
of further stigmatizing lesbians and gay men, as well as withholding 
fundamental rights, such as the freedom from discrimination and the 
ability to partake of a state-sanctioned marriage.l41 On a symbolic 
level, however, the exclusion of gay men and lesbians from collective 
social processes stands as their effective erasure from mainstream po-
litical and social life. 142 This "coerced invisibility" is a highly damaging 
aspect of citizen-sponsored anti-gay rights initiatives, regardless of 
their success or failure. l43 Oregon's first openly gay legislator noted, 
"As a woman, as a lesbian, my humanity is on the ballot again. "144 In 
the same vein, the editor for Just Out, a monthly newspaper for lesbi-
ans and gay men, said, "The rights of any human being should not be 
left up to debate. "145 The citizen initiative process, in its purest sense, 
allows civic-minded voters to "decide" on the identity and status, as 
humans, of lesbians and gay men.l46 For many, it is a process no more 
subtle than a firebomb, but farther-reaching. 
II. THE INITIATIVE PROCESS: ENACTING THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 
A. The Birth and Proliferation of the Initiative Process 
Debate over the merits and uses of the citizen initiative has been 
raging since the 1880s.l47 Along with South Dakota and Utah, Oregon 
was one of the first states to seriously consider and adopt the initiative 
process.l48 Responding to the corruption and inefficiency of Oregon 
139 See Adams, supra note 5, at 463; Gamble, supra note 121, at 258. 
140 Adams, supra note 5, at 463; Gamble, supra note 121, at 258. 
141 See Adams, supra note 5, at 458-63; Gamble, supra note 121, at 258-62. 
142 See Adams, supra note 5, at 472-73; Graves & Hosaka, supra note 105; Meehan, supra 
note 39. 
143 Adams, supra note 5, at 472-73. 
144 Graves & Hosaka, supra note 105. 
145 Meehan, supra note 39. 
146 See Adams, supra note 5, at 472-73; Graves & Hosaka, supra note 105; Meehan, supra 
note 39. 
147 See Schuman, supra note 19, at 948. 
148 See id.; Lazos Vargas, supra note 26, at 411. 
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politics in the late 19th century, Oregon's Progressive political organi-
zations discovered Switzerland's model of direct democracy, which 
allowed for constitutional, statutory, and even national constitutional 
initiatives.149 These radical notions of popular government appealed 
to the citizens at a time when the legislature consisted of "briefless 
lawyers, farmless farmers . . . and political thugs," and, as such, they 
sought to bring direct democracy to Oregon.t50 
In the 1890s, with the leadership of Seth Lewelling and William 
U'Ren, the "Milwaukie Alliance" developed the Populist Party in Ore-
gon and began to infiltrate the state legislature.151 Mter ten years of 
legislative standoff, U'Ren eventually wore down state Democrats and 
Republicans to win virtually unified support for the citizen initiative 
amendment.152 In June of 1902, the initiative and referendum 
amendment passed by a vote of eleven-to-one,153 During this Progres-
sive Era, many other Western states also adopted what came to be 
known as "The Oregon System. "154 
A total of twenty-three states and the District of Columbia cur-
rently provide voters with the option of popular voting through the 
initiative process.155 Most states adopted the process near the turn of 
the century.l56 In accordance with what some political theorists de-
scribe as the individualistic and progressive spirit of the West, only six 
states west of the Mississippi River do not have some form of initiative 
or popular referendum.157 Of all the states that provide for the initia-
tive process, citizens in Oregon and California have used it most of-
ten. l58 Between 1898 and 1992, Oregonians proposed 274 initiatives 
and Californians proposed 236; conversely, eighteen other states pro-
posed an average of forty-two initiatives.159 
149 See Schuman, supra note 19, at 948-49. 
150 See id. at 949-50. 
m See id. at 950-51. 
152 See id. at 951-56. 
155 [d. at 956. 
154 See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 18, at 54-55; Schuman, supra note 19, at 948. 
155 See Lazos Vargas, supra note 26, at 411. The states that provide for initiatives, in the 
order that they adopted the intiative, are South Dakota, Utah, Oregon, Montana, Okla-
homa, Maine, Missouri, Arkansas, Colorado, Arizona, California, Idaho, Nebraska, Nevada, 
Massachusetts, Alaska, Florida, Wyoming, Illinois, District of Columia, and Mississippi. [d. 
at 411 n.34. Florida and Illinois allow only constitutional initiatives. [d. Utah, Maine, Idaho, 
Washington, Alaska, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia allow only for statutory initia-
tives. [d. 
156 See id. 
157 See Lazos Vargas, supra note 26, at 412-13; Magleby, supra note 16, at 14-15. 
158 See Magleby, supra note 16, at 26. 
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Additionally, the total number of all state-proposed initiatives has 
increased dramatically in the last two decades.16o In the 1980s, the 
number of initiatives and referendums proposed nation-wide was less 
than 200; in the 1990s, the number of proposals was projected to be 
over 350.161 In particular, constitutional and statutory initiatives are 
coming to dominate state government in Oregon, California, and 
Colorado.162 In California, the number of citizen initiatives on the 
1990 ballot alone (eighteen) was only slightly lower than all of the ini-
tiatives proposed between 1970 and 1979 (twen ty-two ) .163 
In Oregon, eighteen initiatives were proposed between 1970 and 
1979, while thirty-two were proposed in the 1980s.164 By 1994, thirty-
one initiatives had already been proposed since 1990, with eighteen 
measures on the 1994 ballot alone.165 The September 2000 ballot con-
tained twenty-six ballot measures and required a "bulging" two-
volume Voters' Pamphlet with 607 arguments for and against the pro-
posals.166 The unanticipated size of the pamphlet forced the state 
Elections Division to meet with the Legislative Emergency Board and 
request over $1 million to cover printing and mailing costS.167 
B. An Overview of the Initiative Process 
The citizen initiative is a form of "direct democracy" that, as dis-
tinct from "representative democracy," refers to a system where laws 
are enacted directly by enfranchised citizens rather than by represen-
tatives elected by the citizens.16B The citizen initiative process includes 
three distinct methods by which enfranchised citizens can make 
law.169 Two of these methods are classified as "direct," and the other is 
"indirect. "170 
OCA Measures 9 and 13 are examples of the so-called direct ini-
tiative, where citizens can draft a proposed statute or constitutional 
amendment, obtain a certain percentage of voters' signatures (which 
160 See id. at 27; Lazos Vargas, supra note 26, at 415. 
161 See Magleby, supra note 16, at 27. 
162 Collins & Oesterle, supra note 18, at 48. 
163 Lazos Vargas, supra note 26, at 415 n.55. 
164 See CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, supra note 16, at 13. 
165 See id. 
166 Steve Mayes, Election Outlay Prompts Request for Money, OREGONIAN, Nov. 16, 2000, at 
B12. 
167Id. 
168 CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, supra note 16, at 4. 
169 See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 18, at 50. 
170Id. 
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varies from five to fifteen percent), and add a measure to the ballot.l71 
Under the indirect initiative process, also known as the referendum, 
however, citizens are required to petition the legislature before pro-
ceeding to the signature stage.172 Only if the citizens are rebuffed by 
the legislature may they attempt to gather signatures and force a 
popular vote.173 Generally, the less cumbersome methods of direct 
initiative are preferred to the indirect initiative.I74 
As the 1992 and 2000 versions of Measure 9 illustrate, citizens 
utilizing the direct initiative can choose from two methods to change 
state law: the measure can be drafted either as a statute or as a consti-
tutional amendment. I75 Successful statutory initiatives contribute to 
or revise state or local laws.J76 These initiatives, once they are made 
law, can be altered in one of three ways.177 The state legislature can 
revise or nullify the law according to its ordinary processes; the state 
judiciary can invalidate the law if it is deemed not to conform with 
state or federal constitutional law; or, citizens can change the statute 
through another popular vote.I78 
In contrast, a successful constitutional initiative adds an amend-
ment to the state constitution that overrides other inconsistent laws or 
portions of the state constitution.I79 Thus, courts must limit their re-
view of such amendments to ensure consistency with respect to the 
United States Constitution, and state legislatures have no power to 
alter them whatsoever.I80 Hence, a successful constitutional initiative 
becomes more deeply entrenched in state law than does a statutory 
initiative.I81 
Given that constitutional amendments have more assured per-
manence, most state and local governments require a greater number 
of signatures to qualify constitutional initiatives for the ballot.I82 In 
Oregon, for instance, adding a constitutional initiative to the ballot 
41. 
41. 
171 See Lazos Vargas, supra note 26, at 417. 
172 Collins & Oesterle, supra note 18, at 50. 
173 [d. 
174 See Magleby, supra note 16, at 14. 
175 See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 18, at 50. 
176 See id. at 50-52. 
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requires that the valid signatures of registered voters equal eight per-
cent of the votes cast for governor in the preceding general election; 
in turn, only six percent is required to add a statutory initiative to the 
ballot.183 But despite the more burdensome signature requirement, 
many citizen petitioners nonetheless opt to draft initiatives in the 
form of constitutional amendments and do so, some argue, without 
great difficulty.184 
Many critics posit that the two procedurally distinct forms of the 
direct initiative are beginning to resemble one another in sub-
stance.185 As will be addressed in the next section, petition circulating 
and signature gathering have become profitable industries in some 
states.186 In these states, critics argue, a slightly higher amount of 
campaign funding is all that distinguishes constitutional initiatives 
from statutory initiatives.187 Moreover, some point out that state con-
stitutions have begun to look like books of legislative code, with pen-
sion plans and complicated tax schematics added as amendments.188 
In Oregon, the only state-imposed content restriction for a pro-
posed initiative is that it "shall embrace one subject only. "189 Scholars, 
such as former Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde, have 
urged the state legislature to restrict the constitutional initiative fur-
ther, confining its subject to matters that affect the structure, organi-
zation, or powers of the government only.19o Justice Linde argues that 
the constitutional initiative has been wrongly used to impose obliga-
tions and sanctions on private citizens, such as Oregon's lesbian and 
gay community.191 
183 See id. 
184 See Adams, supra note 5, at 451; Lazos Vargas, supra note 26, at 418-19; Magleby, su-
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C. Direct Democracy in Theory, and in Action 
l. Proponents' Views 
In a country whose democratic system is defined by drawing its 
power from the "consent of governed," it is natural to assume that the 
purest manifestation of that consent-the initiative process-makes 
for the truest democracy.192 Proponents of the citizen initiative view 
direct democracy as an elaboration on the traditional town meeting, 
in which decisions about government flow directly from the "will of 
the people. "193 In true civic fashion, they posit, citizens are not merely 
permitted, but are in fact responsible for educating themselves about 
these decisions.194 This responsibility leads to increased citizen par-
ticipation and to laws that most accurately reflect voters' prefer-
ences.195 
During the Progressive Era, proponents of direct democracy saw 
the initiative process as a way to reduce the voter alienation that was 
due to legislative corruption and special interests.196 Modern propo-
nents continue to view the process as a method of increasing voter 
turnout, empowering citizens to make more meaningful choices 
about the issues of greatest importance.197 Some also make the logi-
cally appealing argument that representative democracy is outmoded 
where technology and modern media make it possible for voters to 
represent themselves directly and with greater efficiency.198 
A 1996 study by the City Club of Portland shows that citizen ini-
tiative proponents in Oregon favor the process for many of these 
same reasons.199 It cites voter education, avoidance of special interests, 
and the preservation of an "integral part of [the] legislative process" 
as some primary factors in support of the initiative.20o Its interviews 
192 See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 18. at 55. 
193 See id. at 53; Magleby, supra note 16, at 19; Schuman, supra note 19, at 947. 
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revealed that proponents view direct democracy as "democratic gov-
ernment in its purest and highest form. "201 As Mabon has repeatedly 
expressed, many also believe that "[t]he initiative is the only way the 
people can adopt constitutional amendments and statutory measures 
which the people favor and the legislature refuses to refer or en-
act. "202 
Critics of the initiative system, however, point to a number of rea-
sons that deliberative legislative bodies might very sensibly refuse to 
enact some of the proposals that are drafted by citizen petitioners.203 
For the purposes of this Note, these reasons are grouped into practi-
cal and ideological concerns. The practical concerns go to the ques-
tion of how well the citizen initiative truly speaks for "the will of the 
people." These will be addressed by rebutting the proponents' argu-
ments that the citizen initiative enhances citizen participation, that it 
represents the issues of most importance to voters, and that it loosens 
the grip of special interests and other corruptive forces. The ideologi-
cal concerns go to the social dangers of expressing the "people's will" 
directly, and will be addressed in Part III of this note. 
2. Rebutting the Civic Participation Argument 
With regard to proponents' claims that the initiative enhances 
civic involvement and voter education, critics urge that in many cases 
full voter participation is actually hindered due to the difficulty in dis-
cerning the actual meaning of some ballot initiatives.204 Additionally, 
some critics argue that the absence of a mechanism to screen the lan-
guage of proposed initiatives for clarity and efficacy leads to ballot 
measures whose consequences are uncertain even to their own spon-
sors.205 
The recent increase in the number of initiatives on the ballot 
creates a significant hurdle for an average voter seeking to educate 
herself about the measures.206 One study demonstrates that voters are 
less likely to vote for any ballot measure as the length of a state or 10-
201 [d. 
202Id. 
203 See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 18, at 55--63; Magleby, supra note 16, at 29-40. 
204 See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 18, at 57; Magleby, supra note 16, at 33-34. 
205 See CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, supra note 16, at 23; Collins & Oesterle, supra note 18, 
at 57; Magleby, supra note 16, at 33-34. 
206 See Adams, supra note 5, at 455; Collins & Oesterle, supra note 18, at 57; Magleby, 
supra note 16, at 33. 
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cal ballot increases.207 Also, critics find that voters with lower incomes 
and less education tend to skip ballot measure questions at a higher 
rate.208 This is unsurprising in light of the fact that some voter's pam-
phlets are written at "a reading level equivalent to that of a third-year 
college student. "209 As such, these factors can lead not only to lower 
voter turnout overall, but may serve to amplify social and class bias.210 
Given that voter's pamphlets are read by only a small fraction of 
those who receive them, a voter's primary source of information 
about a ballot measure is the media.2l1 Media coverage is generally 
divided between news reports and advertisements that are paid for by 
ballot measure campaigns.212 As one might predict, however, cam-
paign-sponsored propaganda is likely to define a ballot measure in 
the light most favorable to its own position.213 As one critic noted, 
some campaigns employ strategies that purposely raise doubts and 
create confusion.214 On controversial issues, opponents and propo-
nents may engage in open contention over the very meaning of a 
measure, its cost, and its consequences.215 Where the text of the 
measure is itself ambiguous, the news media can only serve to parrot 
these campaigns' alternative interpretations.216 
Widely varying debate over critical issues such as the cost and 
fundamental meaning of controversial ballot measures often evi-
dences inadequate drafting and deliberation.217 Citizens with no par-
ticular legal or legislative expertise create proposals with highly com-
plex fiscal and social consequences.218 A state's legislative counsel may 
provide drafting advice to petitioners, but this advice is not manda-
tory.219 Thus, a proposed measure may have consequences wholly un-
207 Collins & Oesterle, supra note 18, at 57. 
208 Magleby, supra note 16, at 35. 
209 SeeJulian N. Eule,Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE LJ. 150~1, 1509 (1990); 
Magleby, supra note 16, at 40. 
210 See Magleby, supra note 16, at 33-34. 
211 See id. at 40; CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, supra note 16, at 23. 
212 See CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, supra note 16, at 23-24. 
213 Magleby, supra note 16, at 38. 
214 See id. at 30 
215 See id. at 38. Conversely, on noncontroversial measures, most voters face an infor-
mation vacuum. [d. 
216 See Graves, supra note 42. 
217 See CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, supra note 16, at 23; Magleby, supra note 16, at 38. 
218 See CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, supra note 16, at 31-34; Leroy J. Tornquist, Direct De-
mocracy in Oregon-Some Suggestionsfor Change, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 675, 677 (1998). 
219 CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, supra note 16, at 23. 
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intended and unforeseen even by its own sponsors.220 Once a measure 
has qualified for the ballot, however, it cannot be amended.221 
Some measures are poorly focused or overly broad, while others 
are simply unconstitutiona1.222 These flaws render such initiatives very 
difficult, if not impossible, to enforce as law.223 Critics note that one 
class of very problematic initiatives are those that create social pro-
grams or promise tax cuts without designating which portions of the 
state budget will be sacrificed as a result.224 Citizen petitioners are not 
required to submit any form of fiscal statement alongside measures 
that drastically interfere with state budgeting.225 These measures thus 
present voters with a desirable program but do not publicize the fiscal 
trade-offs. 226 
Oregon's Measure 7 exemplifies this kind of ballot measure.227 
Approved in November of 2000, Measure 7 is a constitutional 
amendment that requires state and local governments to compensate 
a landowner any time a regulation, such as a zoning or environmental 
restriction, lowers the value of his or her property.228 Under tradi-
tional property law, such "takings" are part of the social contract that 
ordinarily allows government intrusion on behalf of public welfare; 
yet, to the majority of Oregon voters, the compensation requirement 
seemed only fair.229 As "the most far-reaching land use compensation 
measure in the nation," opponents of the measure have called it esti-
22°Id. 
221 See id. 
222 See Magleby, supra note 16, at 38; Tornquist, supra note 218, at 677. 
223 See CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, supra note 16, at 18-19; Brent Hunsberger, Effects of 
Measure 7 Remain Up for Debate, OREGONIAN, Nov. 20, 2000, at AI. 
224 See CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, supra note 16, at 31-34; Tornquist, supra note 218, at 
677; Hunsberger, supra note 223. 
225 See CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, supra note 16, at 25. In preparation for a measure's 
inclusion in the Oregon voter's pamphlet, the secretary of state is required to make a dol-
lar estimate of the financial impact of the measure. Id. The statement does not point out 
the measure's effect on the functioning of government operations, nor does it state the 
dollar amount or its impact as a proportion of the total estimated general fund. Id. Moreo-
ver, a failure to file a fiscal impact statement does not prevent the measure from going on 
the ballot, and the amount of the estimate is not subject to judicial review. Id. 
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mated its cost at $5.4 billion per year.230 In addition, conservationists 
fear that Oregon will be resultantly unable to afford to comply with 
federal environmental regulations, or to continue land use plan-
ning.231 In February, a Marion County judge held that Measure 7 vio-
lated Oregon's constitutional single subject requirement, and that it 
altered other state constitutional provisions without adequately in-
forming Oregon voters; the Oregon Supreme Court heard arguments 
on this issue November 6, 2001 but has yet to announce its decision.232 
As detailed in the discussion of the warring OCA and "No on 9" 
campaigns, Measures 9 and 13 also serve to exemplifY the problems of 
vaguely worded and legally vulnerable ballot measures. 233 The lan-
guage of the first Measure 9 prohibited government "promotion" of 
homosexuality and required public schools to "recognize" it as wrong 
and perverse.234 While opponents feared that these mandates could 
result in book burning and the dismissal of openly gay teachers, the 
open-ended language of the measure enabled Mabon to label these 
concerns "misinterpretations": the manner, and indeed the bare fea-
sibility, of enforcing the measure was up for debate.235 As noted, many 
critics also indicated that a measure requiring teachers to speak 
against the gay community might violate the First Amendment, as well 
as the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution un-
der cases such as Romer v. Evans.236 Mabon has responded to these 
vulnerabilities by attempting to narrow the scope and tighten the 
wording in the drafting of each successive measure.237 Thus, even 
though these OCA measures might very well have been found uncon-
stitutional if enacted, they were nonetheless put to popular vote and 
230 See Charles E. Beggs, Court Hears Arguments on Property Compensation Measure, Asso-
CIATED PRESS NEWSWlRES, Sept. 10,2001; Colby & Anderson, supra note 227; Hunsberger, 
supra note 223. 
231 See Hunsberger, supra note 223. 
232 See Beggs, supra note 230; Dave Hogan & Tomoko Hosaka, Judge Tosses Measure 7, 
OREGONIAN, Feb. 23, 2001, at AI. 
233 See Graves, supra note 42. 
234 SeeANTI-GAY RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 165. 
235 See Alliance that Battled Measure 9 Looks to the Future, supra note 41; Graves, supra 
note 42; Hosaka, supra note 116. 
236 See All Things Considered, supra note 29. The American Civil Liberties Union was 
poised to challenge Measure 9 in the 2000 general election on the grounds that it violated 
the free speech and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. See id. The groups be-
lieved that the similarities between the OCA initiative and Colorado's Amendment 2 were 
great enough that Measure 9 could not have survived federal constitutional review. See id. 
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allowed to threaten the social identity of gay and lesbian Orego-
nians.238 
3. Rebutting the Claim that Initiatives Represent the Most Important 
Issues to Voters 
There is little evidence to support initiative proponents' claims 
that direct democracy has enabled citizens to make laws that are most 
important to them.239 On the contrary, ballots tend to reflect the nar-
row goals of corporations or of ideological or reform groups who wish 
to elevate their causes through the media attention that comes from 
an initiative campaign.240 In 1992, voters indicated that the economy, 
unemployment, and the deficit were the most important political 
problems facing the nation.241 Meanwhile, the OCA went to war for 
the people of Oregon with the anti-sexual deviance platform of Meas-
ure 9.242 As such, proponents would have to argue that "deviant" sex-
ual practices were at the forefront of voter consciousness.243 Can even 
Mabon himself plausibly assert that state-sanctioned sadism was keep-
ing Oregonians awake at night? 
Prior to the OCA's involvement in the initiative process, the Ore-
gon legislature had never addressed the status of lesbian and gay Ore-
gonians.244 While Mabon may cite this inaction as evidence of repre-
sentative neglect, many Oregonians have noted that few citizens gave 
much thought to the so-called "homosexual agenda" prior to its char-
acterization by the OCA.245 According to the president of one Oregon 
community's chamber of commerce, homosexuality "wasn't an issue" 
before OCA legislation.246 In fact, a political scientist at Oregon State 
University is convinced that, "[I]f Martians carried [the three OCA 
leaders] off for their zoo, my sense is this issue would evaporate and 
disappear in a short time. "247 He argues that without the sort of public 
stimulus these ballot measures produce, "most people aren't talking 
238 SeeAN'rI-GAY RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 17-18. 
239 See Magleby, supra note 16, at 35. 
240 [d. 
241 [d. 
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about gay rights. Oregonians have other things they worry about a 
whole lot more than the homosexual agenda. "248 
4. Rebutting the Anti-Corruption Argument 
Another set of criticisms center around proponents' claims that 
the citizen initiative is a method of bypassing legislatures that are cor-
rupted by special interest money and that refuse to enact the laws that 
people really want.249 Indeed, the Progressive Era initiative process 
sought to save government and the underrepresented from corrup-
tive corporate influences.25o But critics note that the modern initiative 
is, in fact, frequently used as a tool for corporations and wealthy or-
ganizations to target unfavorable government policy and minority in-
terests.251 
The notion that the citizen initiative is an alternative to special 
interest-influenced lawmaking is seriously undermined by evidence 
that, in many states, direct democracy has become an industry with 
big corporate contributors.252 Professionals can help draft measures, 
circulate petitions, manage campaigns, provide polling, and produce 
media.253 To such ends, over $117.3 million dollars were spent on bal-
lot measures in twenty-one states in 1992.254 Examples of heavy spend-
ing include $21 million to fight a tobacco tax increase in California 
and $6.8 million by the National Rifle Association to defeat a gun 
control referendum in Maryland in 1988.255 
Oregon is no exception to the trend among citizen initiative 
states that increased spending provides increased political power. 256 
Campaign spending has increased from $50,000 per measure in 1970 
to more than $900,000 per measure in 1990.257 The combined expen-
ditures for the 1992 Measure 9 campaign were well over $2 million 
248 Id. 
249 See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 18, at 56; Linde, supra note 190, at 39~;-98. 
250 See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 18, at 56. 
251 See Linde, supra note 190, at 395-98. See generally Gregory Kafoury, Raiding the Initia-
tive: Carporations vs. Citizens, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 729 (1998). Linde characterizes the 
change as a "shift of 'direct democracy' from people to money, and the deliberate under-
mining of representative government." See Linde, supra note 190, at 395. 
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dollars.258 And, as Mabon reflected, "My belief is that if we would have 
had about $250,000 more, then we could have countered [the oppo-
nents'] litany of lies [and] ... we would have held that lead [in the 
polls] and maybe gained."259 For many, it is frightening to think that 
$250,000 might have been all that kept the OCA's "truth" about 
Measure 9 from deciding the legitimacy of their civil status as Orego-
nians. 260 
III. BRIDLED PASSION: THE PEOPLE'S WILL CONSTRAINED 
A. Representation and Discrimination 
Certainly, one argument advanced by proponents of the citizen 
initiative is almost impossible to rebut. 261 When a majority of voters 
approve or reject a particular citizen-proposed ballot measure, it is an 
expression of that majority's will.262 But is it the best way to make law? 
And, more importantly, is it even a constitutional one? 
Within the traditional three-branch conception of the national 
and state governments, the legislative branch is thought to express the 
will of the people most directly.263 State legislators are selected by a 
small and distinct portion of a state's population; as such, they under-
stand as their primary duty the representation of the narrowed inter-
ests of those citizens.264 Congressional lawmaking is intended to be a 
fairly efficient method of translating the people's will into law. As 
many scholars note, however, even this process contains purposeful 
inefficiencies that temper and inform that translation.265 Legislating 
involves more than a simple counting of hands, and this difference, 
many critics urge, functions as a safeguard against majoritarian ani-
mus and discrimination.266 
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Some scholars articulate this safeguard as the legislators' en-
hanced ability to respond to strong minority interests.267 Legislators 
are able to register the intensity-rather than simply the quantity-of 
citizens' preferences.268 This enables minority groups to persuade leg-
islators to pass the bills that they most strongly desire, even if a major-
ity of citizens would not have approved them.269 More importantly 
perhaps, minorities are able to persuade legislators to amend parts of 
majoritarian bills that they find most objectionable.270 
Others describe the representative safeguard as hindering legisla-
tors' ability to invoke and to fully register a majority's discriminatory 
tendencies.271 As has been discussed with respect to the first Measure 
9, issues that are important only to a few social extremists are not 
given the opportunity to arouse majority prejudice.272 And even where 
members of Congress already hold certain socially extreme views, 
their impulses toward prejudice are chastened through debate and 
public scrutiny, and are ultimately diluted by political compromise.273 
The deliberative process offers exposure to competing needs and op-
portunities to transform one's preferences, and thus filters out many 
of the socially extreme perspectives.274 In contrast, when the lawmak-
ing process is given directly to the citizenry, "[n]o political factors 
counsel restraint on racial [or other prejudice-based] passions ema-
nating from longheld and little considered beliefs and fears. "275 With-
out such political restraints, few of the concerns that can transform 
the "conservative" politician into a "moderate" public official are 
likely to affect the individual voter's decision.276 
Oregon's early history with the initiative and referendum process 
underscores this observation.277 In 1857, voters in the Oregon terri-
tory overwhelmingly approved a referendum intended to exclude all 
free blacks.278 Despite its very small black population, residents of the 
267 See DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN 
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territory had spent years urging the legislature to approve such meas-
ures, but each political party feared the other would exploit the is-
sue.279 Another example of prejudice-based lawmaking came in 1922, 
when the Ku Klux Klan led a majority of Oregon voters to outlaw pri-
vate schools in order to eliminate parochial school education for 
Catholic children.28o Although the United States Supreme Court in-
validated the measure as a violation of the Due Process Clause, Ore-
gon's anti-Catholic animus had still been expressed through law.281 
Thus, where the representative political process would have curbed 
citizens' racist tendencies, direct democracy served as a vehicle for 
their codification.282 
B. The Roots of Republican Government 
To many scholars and critics of the citizen initiative, representa-
tive democracy is not merely ideologically preferable to the initiative 
process, it is also a constitutional mandate.283 Article IV, Section 4 of 
the United States Constitution provides that "the United States shall 
guarantee to every state in this Union a Republican Form of Govern-
ment. "284 The inclusion of this so-called Guarantee Clause is histori-
cally linked to the political unrest of the 1780s and most notably 
Shay'S Rebellion, which dramatized the government's inability to pro-
tect states from citizen uprising under the Articles of Confedera-
tion.285 The early drafters of the Guarantee Clause, James Madison 
and Edmund Randolph, sought to create a provision that would both 
insure citizen sovereignty through "republican" government and also 
suppress domestic conflicts and insurrections.286 In his Federalist Pa-
pers, Madison advanced the view that social division, through the de-
velopment of "factions," was a threat to each goa1.287 
Historians debate the exact significance of the term "republican 
government," but the framers' contemporary statements indicate that 
279Id. at 16--17. 
280 Linde, supra note 30, at 38. 
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194 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 22: 163 
representation was a key component.288 Madison contrasted a "de-
mocracy" from a "republic" by noting that democracy consisted of a 
small number of citizens who assembled and administered the gov-
ernment in person.289 Within a republic, however, "the scheme of rep-
resentation takes place."290 Madison hoped that the representative 
nature of state government would enable the newly formed United 
States to succeed where earlier free societies had failed.291 
From their experience with English monarchy and confederate 
self-government, the framers had learned that factionalism was a seri-
ous threat to stable popular government. 292 Madison defined a faction 
as a "number of citizens, whether amounting to a m.yority or minority 
of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse 
of passion ... adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the perma-
nent and aggregate interests of the community. "293 Where "passion" 
was allowed to reign, he noted, the stronger could readily unite to 
oppress the weaker, and the nation would return to an anarchical 
"state of nature. "294 
Madison felt that a representative legislature was critical to 
the maintenance of democratic order. 295 When the people, 
"blinded by prejudice or corrupted by flattery," called for a measure 
they will later "lament and condemn," Madison looked to the Senate 
to provide "the cool and deliberate sense of community" that 
would thwart such measures.296 He spoke directly against popu-
lar voting with regard to constitutional questions, warning that 
the process would "interest[] too strongly the public pas-
sions. "297 Thus, the Guarantee Clause embodies the framers' vision 
288 See Salz, supra note 283, at 103-04. 
289 SeeTHE FEDERALIST, supra note 31, No. 10, at 58-59 (James Madison). 
290 [d. at 58. 
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that state governments should promote the people's will but also 
guard against the people's passion.29B 
C. Absent Guarantees: The &le of the Supreme Court 
As part of the framers' conception of "mature democracy," the 
Guarantee Clause was meant to preserve the solely representative na-
ture of state lawmaking.299 Given that direct democracy is rapidly com-
ing to dominate the legislative process in many western states, how-
ever, the framers' "republican government" is not exactly 
guaranteed.3OO One reason is the United States Supreme Court's con-
sistent refusal to adjudicate Guarantee Clause claims on the ground 
that they are non justiciable political questions.30l Since 1849, the 
Court has held that determinations about the nature of state govern-
ments are better left to Congress, as a politically accountable branch 
of government.302 Calling reliance on the Guarantee Clause "futile," 
the Court has eliminated any constitutionally based argument for rep-
resentative state democracy in order to avoid politically risky situa-
tions.303 
The first Supreme Court case to address the citizen initiative on 
Guarantee Clause grounds originated in Oregon in 1912, when a cor-
poration objected to a citizen-initiated law requiring it to pay special 
taxes.304 In Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, the Court 
held that the issue was "political and governmental, and embraced 
within the scope of powers conferred upon Congress, and not there-
fore within the reach of judicial power .... ''305 This conclusion was 
reaffirmed in Baker v. Carr, where the Court held that even an equal 
protection claim, if cast as a denial of equal protection in the political 
process, and thus arguably a denial of a republican form of govern-
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ment, was nonjusticiable.306 As such, federal courts have refused juris-
diction of Guarantee Clause claims per se, and state courts have been 
compelled to follow suit.307 
Mter Romer v. Evans, however, federal equal protection jurispru-
dence seemed to be a more promising constitutional approach to de-
feating anti-gay civil rights initiatives.308 But given that Romer failed to 
designate "homosexuals" as a suspect class, initiatives that target lesbi-
ans and gay men are subject only to "rational basis" review, and are 
thus easily distinguished.309 In fact, of the cases that raise equal pro-
tection claims relating to gay civil rights since Romer, five have been 
distinguished from the decision and none have followed it.310 Equality 
Foundation of Greater Cincinnati Inc. v. City of Cincinnati-one of four 
circuit court decisions after Romer-addressed an initiative that forbid 
the city of Cincinnati from enacting any law that provides homosex-
ual, lesbian, or bisexual persons "the basis to have any claim of minor-
ity or protected status, quota preference or other preferential treat-
ment."311 Mter noting that Romer required no form of heightened 
scrutiny, the Court held that the Cincinnati statute was rationally re-
lated to the public interest in preserving "community values and 
306 See 369 U.S. at 226-27. 
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in scope and impact); Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp, 11 F.Supp. 2d 586, 595 (E.D. 
Pa. 1998) (upholding prison officials' consent decrees because Romer only applies to facial 
challenges against statutes "in their entirety"); Bailey v. City of Austin, 972 S.W.2d 180, 190 
(Tex. App.1998) (holding that referendum amendment that eliminated employee 
benefits for domestic partners because it did not target a discrete group. but applied to all 
city employees). 
311 See 128 F.3d at 29l. 
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character. "312 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
1998.313 
In the 1997 case Bailey v. City of Austin, a Texas appellate court 
held that a referendum amendment to a city charter that eliminated 
employee benefits for domestic partners was rationally related to the 
legitimate state interest of "recognizing and favoring legally cogniza-
ble relationships, such as marriage," and thus did not violate equal 
protection guarantees of the Texas Constitution.314 Although the 
court acknowledged that gay and lesbian employees could not enter 
into a legally cognizable marriages, it determined that the imposition 
of a disproportionate burden on gay and lesbian employees was not 
sufficient to trigger an equal protection violation as articulated in Rn-
mer.315 Due to such decisions, some scholars urge that the Supreme 
Court in Romer failed to adequately set out the basis for its decision, 
enabling circuit courts to reach contrary results on nearly identical 
facts. 316 
In light of these decisions rendering the Guarantee Clause "fu-
tile" and limiting Romer's effect on equal protection jurisprudence, a 
successful OCA "No Special Rights" initiative could be very difficult to 
invalidate on constitutional grounds.317 For instance, a future federal 
court might point to Oregon's legitimate state interest in "preserving 
community values and character. "318 As previously noted, before 1992, 
Oregonian's private expressions of sexuality were rarely defined in the 
context of "community values. "319 These days, however, if what are 
now primarily rural "community values" prevail, the private sexual 
expressions of gay Oregonians may determine the extent to which 
they can participate in their primarily urban communities.32o 
mId. at 297. 
m See Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 525 U.S. 943, 943 
(1997). 
M4 See 972 S.W.2d at 189. 
m See id. at 186. 
SI6 Lazos Vargas, supra note 26, at 505. 
m See generaUy Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 
(1962); Pac. States Tele. & Tele. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Equal. Found., 128 
F.3d 289. 
SIS SeeEqual. Found., 128 F.3d at 291. 
SI9 See ANTI-GAY RIGHI'S, supra note 8, at 17; Rubenstein, supra note 60; Sarasohn, Lon 
Mabon Discovers, supra note 70; Sarasohn, Rural Oregon Ponders, supra note 70. 
5~ Seeid. 
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CONCLUSION 
Citizen initiatives that target gay civil rights are the result of a sys-
tem that enables "the people" to translate anti-minority animus into 
public code and constitutional amendment.321 As addressed in Part II 
of this Note, it is a far from flawless translation at that.322 The nature 
of the initiative process puts practical limits on who may participate, 
promote, and even comprehend the often inappropriate or poorly 
articulated choices presented.323 Additionally, it allows social extrem-
ists to exploit voters' latent prejudices to turn misunderstanding into 
divisive and socially damaging campaigns.324 As Part III demonstrated, 
these are not historically novel concerns, and the framers of the Con-
stitution explicitly intended for the "cool and deliberate sense of 
community" to prevail. 325 
In response to these concerns, the Supreme Court has declared 
that reforming direct democracy is the political purview of our na-
tional and state legislatures.326 Indeed, some critics and scholars have 
urged Congress to take up the cause, but direct democracy is "popu-
lar" in more than one sense.327 Despite studies that demonstrate that 
people are confused and misled by the initiative process, twenty-four 
states authorize some form of state-wide initiative and its use is in-
creasing rapidly.328 Curtailing direct democracy in order to protect 
minority interests would be a politically unfavorable and therefore 
highly unlikely course of action for Congress, which must ultimately 
represent the ''will of the people. "329 At the same time, with its restric-
tive view of both the Guarantee and Equal Protection Clauses, the Su-
preme Court has essentially tied the hands of state courts to accom-
plish any lasting reform.33o 
Thus, the Supreme Court is the branch most capable and best 
suited to guard minority interests in this context, given its historic role 
321 See Bell, supra note 21, at 29; Linde, supra note 30, at 31-34. 
322 See supra notes 147-260 and accompanying text. 
323 See supra notes 204-260 and accompanying text. 
324 See Magleby, supra note 16, at 30,38; Analyzing the Ads, supra note 67. 
325 See supra notes 261-320 and accompanying text. 
326 See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Pac. States Tele. & Tele. Co. v. Ore-
gon, 223 U.S. U8 (1912). 
327 See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 18, at 49-50. 
328 See id. 
329 See id. 
330 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-32 (1996); Baker, 369 U.S. at 226-27; Pac. 
States, 223 U.S. at 151; Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 
289,291 (6th Cir. 1997). 
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in the preservation of fundamental rights and enduring constitutional 
aims.331 As illustrated by its civil rights and substantive due process 
jurisprudence, the Court is at times compelled to make socially un-
popular decisions where minority rights are at stake.332 In the citizen 
initiative, the Court is faced with a process that is contrary to the con-
stitutional scheme of state lawmaking because it directly empowers 
the stronger majority to oppress a socially unpopular group of indi-
viduals.333 It is a politically heated issue, but it is precisely because of 
the passion surrounding these issues that minorities' civil rights are 
being overrun.334 The Court must recognize its duty to examine 
Guarantee Clause claims in the case of initiatives that target minority 
interests. 
Although the "minorities" of whom the framers spoke were typi-
cally creditors, property owners, and the wealthy, their political insight 
still endures in the face of expanding social consciousness.335 In 1992, 
with the birth of the first Measure 9, former Oregon Attorney General 
Dave Frohnmeyer noted "the reemergence of ... tribal politics" in 
Oregon and deplored "the growth of politics based upon narrow con-
cerns, rooted in the exploitation of divisions of class, cash, gender, 
region, ethnicity, morality and ideology. "336 He called it a "give-no-
quarter and take-no-prisoners activism that demands satisfaction and 
accepts no compromise. "337 
This language speaks to the divisive potential of the citizen initia-
tive in its most flagrant manifestation.338 As discussed in Part I of this 
Note, the campaigns for Measures 9 and 13 created rifts in voter 
demographics along every imaginable classification, inciting religious, 
geographical and ideological conflict throughout the state.339 These 
are precisely the battles that thinkers like Madison hoped would stay 
m See grmeraUy Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (free speech); Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973) (reproductive rights); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (privilege 
against self-incrimination); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (civil rights). 
M2 See grmera~ &e, 410 U.S. at 113; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown, 347 
U.S. at 483. 
3M SeeTHE FEDERALIST, supra note 31, No. 51, at 334 (James Madison). 
334 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 227 (holding that any reliance on the Guarantee Clause 
"would be futile"). 
335 See Eule, supra note 209, at 1542. 
3:16 Linde, supra note 30, at 32. 
S37 [d. 
338 SeeTHE FEDERALIST, supra note 31, No. 51, at 334, No. 63, at 403-04 (James Madi-
son). 
S39 See supra notes 36-119 and accompanying text. 
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unfought.340 Like laws excluding free blacks or prohibiting Catholic 
education, a measure that limits the social status of gay Oregonians is 
an instance of citizen lawmaking that, as Madison portended, the 
people will later "lament and condemn. "341 
During a gentler time in Oregon's future, these efforts will likely 
come into political focus as attacks on the ideological and social status 
of gay and lesbian Oregonians. At this time, however, the Supreme 
Court must accept jurisdiction to invalidate such initiatives, if success-
fully enacted, before the proliferation of "tribal politics" does irrepa-
rable damage to what we hope is a mature democracy.342 In short, the 
Court must take gay and lesbian identity off the ballot, so that Oregon 
might once again be known as a state characterized by its celebration 
of difference and respect for all people's humanity.343 
340 SeeTHE FEDERALIST, supra note 31, No. 51, at 334, No. 63, at 403--04 (James Madi-
son). 
341 SeeTHE FEDERALIST, supra note 31, No. 63, at 404 (James Madison); Bell, supra note 
21, at 16-17; Linde, supra note 30, at 38. 
342 SeeTHE FEDERALIST, supra note 31, No. 10, at 58-59, No. 49, at 323, No. 51, at 333-
34, No. 63, at 403-04 (James Madison); Linde, supra note 30, at 32. See generally Saiz, supra 
note 283. 
343See generally Salz, supra note 283. 
